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Reference for a preliminary ruling — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted
practices — Article 101(1) TFEU — Selective distribution of luxury cosmetics products —
Clause prohibiting distributors from making use of a non-authorised third party in the con-
text of internet sales — Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 — Article 4(b) and (c)
I. Introduction
On 6 December 2017, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) delivered its much-awaited judgment on
whether it is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU to
prohibit the sale of luxury products via third-party
online platforms or whether such a practice
amounts to a restriction ‘by object’ within themean-
ing of the same article. The case attracted the imme-
diate attention of media and legal scholars primari-
ly because it has practical implications for brand
manufacturers, resellers, mobile consumers using
their smartphones and tablets to make purchases as
well as for the Digital Single Market at large. Addi-
tionally, the Coty judgment clarifies the scope of an
older ECJ ruling - the Pierre Fabre case1, according
to which any clause in a selective distribution con-
tract by which the authorised distributors are com-
pletely prohibited to sell products to the consumers
via the internet is a restriction of competition by
object.
II. Facts
Coty Germany GmbH (Coty Germany) is a leading
supplier of luxury cosmetics in Germany. It sells spe-
cific luxury cosmetic brands via a selective distribu-
tion network in virtue of a distribution contract em-
ployed in a uniform way throughout Europe, ‘in or-
der to support the luxury image of its brands’.2 Selec-
tive distribution is supposed to be an efficient distri-
bution arrangement either for complex technical
products, suchascars,or forproductswhosepurchase
is closely related to a particular brand image, such as
cosmetics, perfumes and luxury goods in general.3 In
this way, it is assured that the retail store will provide
the consumer with a shopping experience consistent
with the product’s brand and reputation.4 In the con-
text of its distribution network contracts, Coty Ger-
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industrie et de l’ emploi [2011] ECR I- 9419.
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many included a new clause [Clause I(1)(3)] which
contemplated that its authorised retailers were enti-
tled to offer and sell the products on the internet on-
ly via their own internet sites/online stores and not
by making use of third-party platforms in a dis-
cernible manner. In this way, the use of a different
business name as well as the recognisable engage-
ment of a third-party undertaking was forbidden.
Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (‘Parfümerie Akzen-
te’), an authorised retailer of Coty Germany’s prod-
ucts formany years,whichwasmaking internet sales
partly through its own online store and partly via the
platform ‘amazon.de’, decided not to sign the amend-
ments to the selective distribution contract and dis-
approve the new clause. As a result, Coty Germany
brought an action before the competent National
Court of First Instance in order to prevent the for-
mer from distributing the latter’s products via the
platform <amazon.de>, in accordance with Clause
I(1)(3).
TheNational Court of First Instance dismissed Co-
ty Germany’s action on the ground that the clause at
issue was contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU as well as
toParagraph 1 of theGermanLawagainst restrictions
of competition. It was held that such a clause consti-
tutes a hardcore restriction under Article 4(c) of the
VerticalAgreementsBlockExemptionRegulationNo
330/2010 and that it cannot be justified even for the
sake of the brand’s prestigious image. The relevant
court drew this conclusion based on the judgment of
13 October 2011 in the Pierre Fabre case. Moreover,
the clause at issue could not benefit from an individ-
ual exemption since Coty Germany had notmanaged
to prove that the overall prohibition on internet sales
via third-party platforms could bring efficiency gains
that would outweigh the competition disadvantages
in the market. After all, such a general prohibition
could not pass the proportionality test, as there were
other means, equally appropriate and less restrictive
of competition that Coty Germany could take, like
the application of specific quality criteria for the use
of third-party platforms.
CotyGermany appealed against the decision of the
First Instance court before the Higher Regional
Court, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The relevant
Court of Appeal decided to stay the proceedings and
ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, uncertain as it
was about whether the contractual arrangement ex-
isting between both parties to the dispute was law-
ful under EU competition law.
III. Judgment
The ECJ confirmed the legality of selective distribu-
tion systems, to the extent that resellers, such as Par-
fümerie Akzente, are chosen on the basis of objec-
tive criteria of a qualitative nature that are laid down
uniformly for all potential resellers and are applied
in a non-discriminatory fashion, without going be-
yond what is necessary.5 It also restated that in case
of luxury goods, the characteristics and conditions of
a selective distribution network preserve and ensure
the aura of luxury that such goods have apart from
their high-quality material characteristics.6 There-
fore, as long as the aforementioned criteria are met,
the adoption of a selective distribution network for
luxury goods is absolutely in line with Article 101(1)
TFEU and this cannot be doubted by the assertion
included in Paragraph 46 of the Pierre Fabre judg-
ment. That assertion should be read and interpreted
only in relation to the context of that particular judg-
ment.7
Regarding contractual clauses such as the one at
issue, the ECJ held that they are not precluded either
under Article 101(1) TFEU, since they are designed to
preserve the luxury image of goods in the context of
a selective distribution system which was held to be
completely lawful under Article 101(1) TFEU. How-
ever, similarly to selective distribution systems, in or-
der to be lawful, a contractual clause, such as that at
issue, shouldmeet the criteriamentioned above. This
means that 1) it should have the objective of preserv-
ing the luxury image of goods, 2) it should be laid
down uniformly and it should not be applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion, 3) it should be proportionate in
the light of the objective pursued.
Further, the ECJ clarified that a clause, such as that
at issue, does not constitute a restriction of cus-
tomers, within themeaning of Article 4(b) of the Ver-
tical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation No
330/2010nor does it restrict passive sales to endusers
within the meaning of Article 4(c) of the same Reg-
ulation. This is so because the clause at issue does
not prohibit the use of the internet as ameans ofmar-
5 C-230/16 Coty Germany (n 2) para 24; C-439/09 Pierre Fabre (n
1) para 41; Case C-26/76 Metro SB‑Großmärkte v Commis-
sion [1977] ECR 1875, para 20.
6 Case C-59/08 Copad SA v Christian Dior couture SA and Others
[2009] ECR I-3421, paras 24-26, 29.
7 C-230/16 Coty Germany (n 2) para 31.
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keting the contract goods.8Additionally, the selective
distribution contract at issue allows, under certain
conditions, authorised distributors to advertise via
the internet on third-party platforms and to use on-
line search engines.9 As a result, customers are still
able to find the online offer of authorised distribu-
tors by using such engines.
IV. Comments
The ECJ saw in the preliminary questions submitted
by the Higher Regional Court a great opportunity to
clarify the rather vague point made in the Pierre Fab-
re case, Paragraph 46 of the judgment. According to
that paragraph,
the aim of maintaining a prestigious image is not
a legitimate aim for restricting competition and
cannot therefore justify a finding that a contrac-
tual clausepursuing suchanaimdoesnot fallwith-
in Article 101(1) TFEU.
The ECJ underlined that the above assertionmust be
read and interpreted in the light of that particular
judgment’s context and so it is related solely to the
goods at issue,meaning cosmetic and hygiene goods.
Therefore, it does not apply to luxury goods. The dif-
ferentiation made by the ECJ and the limitation of
the Pierre Fabre case to the very specific internet ban
situation has brought clarity and legal certainty to
market participants like themembers of selective dis-
tribution systems. It also put an end to highly diver-
gent interpretations.
For the first time the ECJ referred to the visibility
of third-party online platforms and it underlined that
the authorised retailers were prohibited to offer and
sell theproductsonlyonvisible third-partyplatforms.
This means that authorised distributors are still per-
mitted to sell the luxury goods online via unautho-
rised third-party platformswhen the use of such plat-
forms is not discernible to the consumer. It is under-
stood that the reason for such a distinction between
discernible and indiscernible third-party online plat-
forms, is that the former can detract from the luxu-
ry imageof luxurygoods.Yet,what isnotunderstood,
nor explained by the ECJ is how an unnoticeable
third-party online platform is able to correspond to
specific qualitative conditions better than recognis-
able andwell-known platforms, such as Amazon and
eBay, which are huge players in online sales. It is be-
lieved that this is an unequal treatment of third-par-
tyonlineplatformswhichopens thedoor togreymar-
keters that will take advantage of the situation by try-
ing to take the place of the discernible third-party
platforms in the market. Such an approach is also
quite contradictory to the priority that the suppliers
and authorised distributors of luxury goods say they
have, ie to secure the online sale of their products in
an environment that corresponds to certain qualita-
tive conditions. In addition to this, the ECJ enabled
the advertisement of luxury products via the inter-
net on third-party platforms as well as the use of on-
line search engines so that customers may find the
online offer of authorised distributors by using such
engines. In this way, the ECJ avoided an absolute on-
line platform ban as such a thing would make it dif-
ficult for retailers to access themobile customer base.
This would be a great problem, especially for small
retailers that become visible and sell products
through third-party platforms without having to
make great investments and efforts.
Despite the two aforementioned remarkable
points made by the ECJ in the Coty case, still there is
residual uncertainty regarding particular issues. The
first issue is the definition of ‘luxury goods’. Since
the judgment was limited to luxury brand owners,
leaving out of its scope other brand owners, it would
be expected from the ECJ to set clear criteria about
what amounts to ‘luxurious products’ and what does
not. To everyone’s great disappointment, thiswasnot
done, while the ECJ could have easily avoided such
vagueness if it had weighed in by adopting or explic-
itly rejecting the approach of the Advocate General
Wahl who referred to ‘high-quality consumer goods’
and ‘brands’ apart from luxury brands as the ECJ
did.10As a result of this open question, it remains un-
clear which products are supposed to be outside the
luxury industry andwhat applies to them, since each
EUMember State may have a different point of view
about what is luxury and what is not, depending on
its standard of living. There are also concerns that
manymanufacturers will try to abuse this uncertain-
8 ibid, para 65.
9 ibid, para 67.
10 Case C-230/16 Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente
GmbH [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:941, Opinion of AG Wahl, paras
43, 46, 69 and 70. For a more detailed analysis of AG Wahl’s
Opinion, see Dimitris Vallindas, ‘Selective Distribution Systems
Relating to Luxury and Prestige Products: Advocate General
Wahl’s Opinion in the Coty Case’ (2017) 1(4) CoRe 361 – 366.
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ty bypresenting andpromoting their products as lux-
urious ones, though actually they are not luxurious.
This may happen for the sake of getting extra leeway
in the competition rules and in order to take advan-
tage of the selective distribution systems.11 This is
particularly true if we take into account the fact that
selective distribution systems are verywidespread in
the EU over the last ten years and they are used by a
large number of manufacturers, not only for a par-
ticular category of goods.12 Leaving open the issue of
what ‘luxurious product’ means is tantamount to en-
abling brand owners and large retailers to use meth-
ods that may circumvent the application of selective
distribution systems, just in order to exclude from
distribution networks pure online players, such as
Amazon and eBay as well as smaller retailers that
tend to realise a large proportion of their sales via
these online platforms. Practically speaking, this
means that selective distribution systems may turn
out to be used even in casees of fast moving/day-to-
day consumer goods, such as clothes, sports shoes or
electrical household appliances, as long as they are
branded as luxurious. Such a thing may put mobile
consumers in danger of not having anymore the pos-
sibility to immediately obtain and compare product
and price information online as well as to switch
quickly from one online channel to another.
The second issue regards the proportionality test
which was missed by the ECJ. The ECJ has not ade-
quately explained why it opted for an absolute re-
striction of using in a discernible manner third-par-
ty platforms for the internet sale of luxury goods. The
Court could have found a less restrictivemeans in or-
der to fulfil the same objective, which is to preserve
the luxury image of those goods. The ECJ also refers
to the Higher Regional Court (ie the referring court)
to assess the proportionality test and make the rele-
vant enquiries.13 Our disagreement with the ap-
proach that the ECJ adopted regarding the propor-
tionality test is further strengthened by the fact that
thedefendantsmadeanalternative suggestionwhich
was rejected by the Court without adequate justifica-
tion.14 The suggestion concerned the contract con-
cluded between the brand owner and the authorised
reseller, which could include a list of qualitative cri-
teria that should be fulfilled by the third-party plat-
form on which the authorised reseller may want to
sell. According to this suggestion, anytime the plat-
formwould not fulfil through its structure or presen-
tation these qualitative criteria, the brand owner
could ask for the cancellation of the contract. How-
ever, the Court persisted in a measure which is situ-
ated at the end of the competition restrictions’ spec-
trum.
The third aspect of the Coty case which remains
rather unclear is what will happen after this judg-
ment - both to the 31% of retailers who sell partly via
their online shops and partly on marketplaces, and
to the 4% of retailers who sell online only via mar-
ketplaces.15Since theuseof third-partyplatformshas
increased over time, there will surely be retailers
across the EU who either have no other way to sell
their products on the internet or face financial prob-
lems by having to avoid the use of discernible third-
party platforms for the online sale of luxury goods.
The uncertainty is exasperated by the remaining lack
of clarity about the definition of luxury goods. This
is particularly true in EUMember Stateswhere third-
party platforms play a really important role. In Ger-
many, for instance, 62%of retailersusemarketplaces,
while in the United Kingdom the share is 43% and
in Poland 36%.16 Furthermore, it is small and medi-
um-sized retailers that mostly use third-party plat-
forms as a sales channel17, therefore the risk of not
being able to bear the cost of such a prohibition is
imminent. In view of these parameters, it is argued
that there may be cases in certain EUMember States
where the third-party platform ban, even under the
conditions set by the ECJ, will amount to a hardcore
restriction according to the Vertical Agreements
Block Exemption Regulation No 330/2010.
In conclusion, theCoty case could be characterised
as a pyrrhic victory for the ECJ. On the one hand, it
managed to fill the interpretative gaps of the Pierre
Fabre case, but on the other hand, it has raised a lot
of issues which remain unsolved and uncertain.
11 Stefan Krawczyk, ‘The Day after Coty: Implications for Online
Distribution of Brands in Europe’ (Steptoe & Johnson LLP confer-
ence, Brussels, December 2017).
12 C-230/16 Coty Germany, Opinion of AG Wahl (n 10) fn 4; See
also Commission, ‘Final Report on the E-commerce Sector In-
quiry’ COM (2017) 229 final, para 15(ii) (‘Report on the E-com-
merce Sector Inquiry’).
13 C-230/16 Coty Germany (n 2) paras 55-57.
14 ibid, para 56.
15 Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry (n 12) para 39(i).
16 ibid, para 39 (ii).
17 ibid, para 39 (iii).
